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Abstract:  Traditional user-oriented access control models such as Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) cannot differentiate between processes acting on behalf of users and 
those behaving maliciously. Consequently, these models are limited in their ability to protect users from the 
threats posed by vulnerabilities and malicious software as all code executes with full access to all of a user's 
permissions. Application-oriented schemes can further restrict applications thereby limiting the damage 
from malicious code. However, existing application-oriented access controls construct policy using complex 
and inflexible rules which are difficult to administer and do not scale well to confine the large number of 
feature-rich applications found on modern systems. Here a new model, Functionality-Based Application 
Confinement (FBAC), is presented which confines applications based on policy abstractions that can 
flexibly represent the functional requirements of applications. FBAC policies are parameterised allowing 
them to be easily adapted to the needs of individual applications. Policies are also hierarchical, improving 
scalability and reusability while conveniently abstracting policy detail where appropriate. Furthermore the 
layered nature of policies provides defence in depth allowing policies from both the user and administrator 
to provide both discretionary and mandatory security. An implementation FBAC-LSM and its architecture 
are also introduced.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Traditional access control models such as 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC) and Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC) are based on the paradigm of 
protecting users from one another (Department of 
Defense, 1985, Ferraiolo et al., 1995). Consequently 
programs typically run with all of the user's 
privileges. These models cannot differentiate 
between a program acting on the behalf of a user and 
a program using its privileges nefariously (Miller 
and Shapiro, 2003). As a result vulnerabilities and 
malware represent a serious threat as malicious code 
has unrestricted access to the user's privileges. 
Existing application confinement schemes 
attempt to address this by limiting the privileges 
associated with processes, thereby mitigating the 
impact from vulnerabilities and malicious code. 
Several techniques have been developed to provide 
application-oriented access controls; however, these 
techniques do not provide abstractions which are 
easy for users to apply, and do not scale well to 
confine the numerous feature rich applications found 
on modern systems.  
A new application-oriented access control model 
Functionality-Based Application Confinement 
(FBAC) is presented which provides separation of 
duties, defence in depth through layers of mandatory 
and discretionary application-oriented access 
controls and policy abstractions which are flexible, 
manageable and easy to conceptualize. 
2 APPLICATION-ORIENTED 
ACCESS CONTROL MODELS 
Existing application-oriented access control models 
assign privileges using monolithic self-contained 
non-hierarchical policy abstractions. This limits the 
scalability of these approaches as these abstractions 
can not adapt to the different security needs of 
applications.  
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Isolation sandboxes such as chroot, BSD Jails 
(Kamp and Watson, 2000), Solaris Zones (Tucker 
and Comay), and Danali (Whitaker et al., 2002) 
provide a single policy abstraction, the isolated 
container, which simply restricts contained 
applications to a limited namespace (Kamp and 
Watson, 2004) or virtual machine (Madnick and 
Donovan, 1973). Isolation requires significant 
redundancy as shared resources need to be 
duplicated (Krohn et al., 2005). It also inhibits the 
ability of applications to easily and securely 
exchange data as is commonly required.  
Some application-oriented schemes mediate 
access to specified resources by simply assigning 
raw privileges to processes. These are either 
coarsely grained (such as with POSIX capabilities  
(Bacarella, 2002), and Bitfrost (Krsti and Garfinkel, 
2007)) or finely grained (as with CapDesk (Miller et 
al., 2004), Polaris (Stiegler et al., 2006), TRON 
(Berman et al., 1995), Systrace (Provos, 2002) and 
Janus (Wagner, 1999)). Methods of mediating this 
type of access control include using capabilities 
(Wagner, 2006) or system call interposition 
(Goldberg et al., 1996). These privilege associations 
provide very little policy abstraction other than the 
granularity of the privileges assigned making the 
policy either inexpressive or extremely large and 
complex (Garfinkel, 2003). Translating high level 
security goals into finely grained policies is difficult, 
making these policies difficult to both construct and 
verify for correctness (Marceau and Joyce, 2005). 
Models such as Domain and Type Enforcement 
(DTE) (Badger, 1996) which extends the type 
enforcement model (Boebert and Kain, 1985) , Role-
Compatibility (RC) (Ott, 2002), and AppArmour 
(previously known as SubDomain) (Cowan et al., 
2000) provide large inflexible policy abstractions 
which, although capable of grouping related 
privileges, cannot adapt to the various policy needs 
of feature rich applications. For example, although a 
DTE domain represents a policy abstraction, 
domains typically apply to a single application only 
(Marceau and Joyce, 2005). Additionally, there is 
significant overlap of privileges granted to compiled 
domain policies and yet domains are specified 
separately (Jaeger et al., 2003). 
Although some implementations of these models 
allow a policy abstraction to be comprised of smaller 
parts, these parts are reduced to a monolithic policy 
abstraction either at system start-up or in advance, 
which limits their flexibility. One example of this is 
SELinux’s DTE Domains which can be specified 
using macros in the m4 language which are 
compiled in advance into many lines of rules, 
thereby creating a single policy abstraction (a 
Domain) directly containing all the relevant 
privileges. Similarly, any abstractions in AppArmor 
profiles are compiled away at system start-up and 
applied as a raw list of privileges associated with the 
application. This approach means that any finer 
grained abstractions which may have been in place 
when constructing policy is not available when 
managing the privileges of a process. 
DTE and RC policy abstractions define multiple 
restricted environments and allow propagating 
processes to transition between them. Specifying 
these transitions is often a complex and error-prone 
task. Programs need specific authorisation to label 
files as being accessible in different domains or 
roles, and users and programs both need permission 
in order to execute programs belonging in another 
domain or role (Hinrichs and Naldurg, 2006). 
3 THE  FBAC  MODEL 
Inspired by the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
model (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992), behaviour based 
process confinement research (Raje, 1999), 
programming language features such as subroutine 
parameterisation, and by applying a unique approach 
to defence in depth, Functionality-Based Application 
Confinement (FBAC) provides an expressive, finely 
grained, yet easy to apply and manage application 
confinement. In contrast to existing application-
oriented models FBAC allows reusable and flexible 
policy abstractions to be defined which can be 
adapted to suit the needs of different applications 
with related security goals. 
3.1 Functionality-based 
The design of the FBAC model originated from 
observing the advantages that the RBAC model 
brings to the management of user privileges and 
FBAC employs an analogous paradigm for the 
confinement of individual programs. While in 
RBAC different users share common sets of 
privileges relating to their role within an 
organisation (Ferraiolo et al., 1995), in application 
confinement each category of application requires 
related sets of privileges corresponding to their 
intended behaviour (Raje, 1999). Recognizing this 
correspondence provides a convenient mechanism to 
both model the privileges that a program requires 
and for end users to assign a program the privileges 
it needs based upon the functionality the application 
performs. Therefore, while RBAC assigns privileges 
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to users according to their role, FBAC employs 
reusable and flexible policy abstractions known as 
functionalities  describing the actions that an 
application may legitimately perform. For example, 
the shared functionality of different web browsers is 
reflected in their requiring a common set of 
privileges to carry out their tasks and forms the basis 
on which end users assign an application 
confinement policy.  
Furthermore, applying an RBAC-like approach 
to application confinement also provides the benefit 
of separation of duties. Static separation of duty 
prevents conflicting functionalities or privileges 
from being assigned to the same application while 
dynamic constraints ensure that specified sets of 
privileges cannot be activated concurrently at 
runtime.  
3.2 Hierarchical  Policy 
Unlike existing application confinement models, 
FBAC policies are constructed in a hierarchical 
fashion by employing a ANSI/NIST RBAC-like 
structure (Ferraiolo et al., 2001). This allows layers 
of abstraction and encapsulation with high-level 
functionalities describing the overall purpose of the 
application (for example, web_browser and 
email_client) and mid-level functionalities 
specifying the functional components which make 
these up such as http_client and pop3_client. These 
in turn are built from low-level abstractions 
describing the finely-grade privileges available on 
the system, for example file_r for reading from a 
file. This hierarchical structure improves the 
manageability of policy by encapsulating details 
while providing flexible abstractions for association 
with specific applications. This allows FBAC 
policies to be applied to multiple applications where 
these have shared functionality and provides 
improved scalability compared with existing finely 
grained application confinement models. 
The hierarchical design of FBAC's policy 
abstractions allows small or large policy components 
to be easily activated or deactivated at runtime. This 
action may be initiated by the user, the administrator 
or even the software itself. For example, in the case 
of multi-functionality applications such as the Opera 
web browser which also incorporates e-mail, IRC, 
news reader and bittorrent client  functionality, the 
user can actively control the privileges currently 
available to the program according to those 
functionalities being used at the time. This is 
analogous to a user under RBAC only activating the 
rolls relating to the part of their job description they 
are currently performing and allows the principle of 
least privilege to be enforced. This level of run-time 
policy control is not available with existing 
application-oriented access control models such as 
DTE or AppArmor where privileges are contained in 
a monolithic abstraction associated with the security 
context. For example, in DTE or AppArmor 
dropping the ability to send emails would involve 
transitioning to an entirely separate domain or 
profile. 
3.3 Functionality  Parameterisation 
Based on the results of previous research which 
explored the use of parameterisation for application 
sandboxes (Raje, 1999), functionalities are 
parameterised to allow them to be applied to 
different applications with similar functionality; for 
example, two different web browsers. This allows 
application confinement policies to be customised to 
the specifics of each program (such as where it 
stores configuration files etc.) while maintaining the 
abstraction of the original policy specification.  
FBAC functionalities are passed arguments in a 
fashion similar to subroutines in programming 
languages. Subsequently, the hierarchical 
relationship between functionalities allows 
arguments to propagate to any contained 
functionality. By specifying resource names as 
arguments functionalities can be reused within the 
hierarchy to grant access to various resources.  
Functionality definitions may contain default 
argument values. This maintains abstraction and 
simplifies the process of assigning functionalities to 
applications in common cases while not restricting 
flexibility where customisation is required. 
Although the MAPbox mechanism (Acharya and 
Raje, 2000) has previously employed 
parameterisation to support application confinement, 
FBAC overcomes limitations of this approach by 
allowing confinement of multipurpose applications 
and providing a more manageable policy structure 
than that of MapBox, where users assign a complex 
finely-grained list of privileges to each class. 
3.4  Mandatory and Discretionary 
Controls 
Another feature of the FBAC model is its ability to 
confine applications based upon the combination of 
policies specified by both users and administrators. 
While existing application oriented access controls 
are generally designed to be applied as either a 
discretionary control (such as Janus or TRON) or a 
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mandatory control (such as AppArmor or DTE), 
FBAC allows both mandatory and discretionary 
policies to be applied simultaneously. This allows 
users to ensure their applications execute with least 
privilege and protect themselves from malicious 
code while also allowing administrators to restrict 
applications to enforce system-wide security goals, 
confine users to specific programs or to manage user 
protection. Each of these policies is known as an 
FBAC  confinement  and may reuse functionalities 
from other confinements. The privileges of an 
application therefore depend upon the intersection of 
the privileges specified by the confinements which 
apply to it. This layered approach to application 
confinement is unique and provides defence in-depth 
while requiring the maintenance of only a single 
mechanism. 
4  USING FBAC 
The initial task of establishing functionalities 
involves the construction of functionalities which 
represent functional requirements of applications. 
Functionalities can contain other functionalities and 
can also contain direct privileges. The hierarchical 
and modular nature of FBAC policy eases 
management and maintenance. This initial 
functionality creation task involves the analysis of 
existing applications and requires some expertise 
and would normally therefore be done by a trusted 
third party.  
However, subsequently users and administrators 
can restrict applications with FBAC by simply 
assigning the appropriate functionalities and 
providing any arguments necessary to satisfy 
parameters. This process is well suited to a GUI and 
mostly involves pointing and clicking. Familiarity 
with the FBAC-LSM policy language is unnecessary 
for ordinary users who can simply use graphical 
tools to confine applications. 
Administrators can easily limit users to specific 
applications and specify what those applications can 
do. Users may then supply more restrictive 
parameters protecting their own resources from the 
application.  
5 REPRESENTING  POLICY 
Figure 1 is an example policy representation of a 
simple functionality which provides an abstraction 
to read the contents and attributes of a file. The first 
line simply specifies the name of the functionality 
(functionality [name]). The directives 
which detail the functionality are enclosed in curly 
braces. Each directive ends in a semicolon. The first 
two directives are for a graphical tool to describe the 
purpose and level of detail of the functionality. Then 
a parameter named files is specified; its default 
value is to grant access to nothing (parameter 
[parameter name] "[default value]"). 
After the purpose of this parameter is described, two 
privileges are included, which permit access to the 
files described by the parameter. (privilege 
[operation name] ["literal 
filename" or parameter name]).  
A functionality can also contain another 
functionality with the following syntax 
(functionality [functionality name] 
([optional parameter name=] 
[["literal filename" or parameter 
name], ...)) 
Application profiles share a similar syntax, with 
a difference in the initial definition (application 
[name]) and contain a list of binaries which make 





access to these files"; 
lowlevel; 
parameter files ""; 
parameter_description "allows these 
files to be accessed as described"; 
privilege file_read files; 
privilege file_getattr files; 
} 
Figure 1: Low-level FBAC-LSM functionality and 
privileges. 
6  THE IMPLEMENTATION - 
FBAC-LSM 
A prototype implementation of FBAC is near 
completion. FBAC-LSM is a Linux Security Module 
(LSM) (Wright et al., 2002) with accompanying 
policy tools. As Figure 2 illustrates, FBAC-LSM is 
comprised of a graphical Policy Manager tool which 
is used to maintain policy, the LSM which resides in 
kernel space and enforces security decisions, a 
Policy Server which feeds the policy into the LSM 
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via a virtual file system at system boot or on request, 
and a graphical Process Manager tool which can be 
used to activate or deactivate the functionalities 
associated with a running process. When an 
application attempts to access any mediated 
resource, after standard DAC rules apply, the LSM 
is consulted and the request is either allowed or 
rejected based on the FBAC policy as represented in 
the LSM. Figure 3 illustrates the simple task of 











Figure 2: FBAC-LSM architecture. 
 
Figure 3: The graphical FBAC-LSM Policy Manager tool. 
7 RESEARCH  STATUS 
FBAC-LSM has shown promising results and a 
hierarchy of functionalities that represent the 
functionalities required for some common 
applications, such as web browsers, has been 
developed. When the prototype system is complete a 
detailed study comparing the security and usability 
of the new system with existing systems such as 
SELinux and AppArmor will be presented and 
FBAC-LSM will be made available open source 
using the General Public Licence. 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
FBAC consolidates concepts from user-oriented 
access control, and application sandboxing research 
to provide an application-oriented access control 
model which confines applications in terms of the 
functions they perform. Policy is hierarchical, 
parameterised and multi-layered. This approach 
provides security and policy management benefits 
such as conceptual simplicity through abstraction 
and encapsulation, policy reusability and flexibility, 
improvements in scalability, separation of duties, 
dynamic process controls, and defence in depth. 
Preliminary results of the new model are promising 
and further study of the efficacy of the model in 
action is warranted. 
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